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Latin American migration
to Canada: new linkages in
the hemispheric migration
and refugee flow system
The llow of migrants from Latin America to Canada, although
recent, is now quite large. Approxim"t.ly 2oo,ooo Latin Ameri-
cans have moved to Canada since 1966, and the general trend
over time has been upward. How did this movement start? What
sustains it? What are its future prospecs?
Latin Americans have moved to'Canada in waves, each wave
respoiding to a crisis in a particular sending country or group of
countriec' and to related international circumstances favouring
entry to Canada. The laqgest waves 
- 
from Chile in the rg?os
and from El Salvador in the rgSos 
-were initiated and sustained
latgrty by flight from dictatorship, state teror, civil war, and
violence.' Other, smaller, flows 
- 
such as those from Argentina,
Guatemala, and Peru 
- 
also arose in periods of internal strife
approaching civil war. These violent beginnings to the flows of
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Latin American migrants to Canada contrast with the more
straightforward economic motivation for migration to Canada
from the Commonwealth Caribbean (the other major source of
Canadian irnmigrants in the Americas). Chilean and Salvador-
ean migrants to Canada also stand out as individuals who were
fleeing right-wing and military dictatorships, which were backed
or encouragd by the United States government, in the context
of the suppression of leftist politics. In other cases which involved
Cold War issues, Canada followed the lead of the United States
and other Western nations in showing an almost exclusive pref-
erence for refugees fl."it g from communist regimes.s
Not all Latin American immigrants to Canada are refugees
from violence; many other migrants from the region have moved
principally in search of economic o. pportunity and social mobil-
ity. Some of these 'economic' migrants are skilled workers and
professionals who may not have been exposed to p€rsonal threat
or exceptional danger. Yet even economic migrants from Latin
America are more likely to come to Canada during periods of
generalized political turmoil and violence in their home coun-
tries.-Violence and problems of security clearly play a role in
their- decision to move.
The emergence in Canada of sizeable communities of Latin
Americans with their own nervspapers, radio progrilrnmes, and
social clubs cannot be explained entirely by the violence and
economic conditions which motivated them to emigrate. One
must also examine what led them to choose Canada rather than
other pcsible destinations and how Canadian policies affected
this choice. Prior to rg7o there was virtually no history of Latin
American migration to Canada, and in consequence particular
attention needs to be given to the special conditions which
sparked the first flows. Once the pioneering flows have been
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explaincd, onc can then ask whether new migrants have been
motivated to move to Canada largely by their links to earlier
migrants, and whether the chain of migration thus e3tablished
will continue.
The analpis of the migration linlc between Latin America
and Canada must be seen and understood as part of a hemi-
qpheric migration system. Within this qntem, migrant and refu-
gee florvs from Latin America to Canada depend on four main
factors: (r) social, economic, and political conditions in the send-
ing countries; (r) social, economic, and political conditions in
the various potential destination countries in the system, includ-
iug Canada; (3) Canada's immigration and refugee policies; and(d migta"t social and kin networks.r Causality within the slntem
is complex and reciprocal. For example, changes which were
made in Canadian policies in the rg6os and rgTos clearly opened
the dibr to Latin American refugees and migrants. Yet Cana-
dian public awareness of violence and repression in countries
(such as Chile in rg73-4 just after the Pinochet coup) also had a
role in shaping these very policies, particularly the new policies
on refugees implemented in rg78. Similarly, the plight of Salva-
dorean refugee claimants in the rgSos had an impact on the
internal refugee determination procedures adopted by Canada
over this decade. The inter-American s1rutem and its migration
dynamic are both evolving in wap which Euggest continuing
florvs of Latin Americans to Canada over the proximate future
at least,
THE TNTER.AMERICAN SYSTEM
The timing of Latin American migration to Canada, the major
source countries of this flow, and the characteristics of the
migrana themsclves were inlluenced by the historical coinci-
dence of several factors. These factors may be viewed as loosely
* This ic an abbreviatcd vicn of thc inter-American migration rFrcm. A more com-
pkte vicr wotrld cremine tbc rrtationrhip benvecn conditioru in Latin Amcrica
eud politicd crilb).rd conditioru in Nonh Amcrica (relatirc afflu-
cncc rnd political *rbility), grving erplicit ettention to the na llow of profit+
from thc Sqrth to tbc Nonh.
articulated 
- 
that is, partly related to one another 
- 
within the
hemispheric system. There are four major elements.
r Widespread economic and social-political crisis throughout
Latin America in the rg?os and rg8os.s This generalized cri-
sis clearly sets the context for rising emigration from the
region. Over these two decades, signific'nt economic down-
turn, periodic dictatorship and political repression, and
spreading violence in the region stimulated large numbers of
Latin Americans to seek safety and economic security else-
where, and particularly in the United States. Yet many Latin
American nations had previously undergone periods of eco-
nomic turmoil and political violence which had not provoked
such movement to the United States. In addition, Latin
American migrants from some countries, particularly Mexico
but also elsewhere, had been arriving in the United States for
many years, even during periods of relative stability and eco-
nomic growth in the region. Much of the emigration from
rg?o to rggo mruit then be explained by changes in the over-
all system which operated along with the turmoil and vio-
lence in migrants' countries of origin. Of particular impor-
tance was the spread of diverse institutional, cultural, social,
and economic connections linking Latin America more fully
to the United States and (to a much lesser extent) to Canada.
e Canadian refugee and immigration policies. Changes in
Canadian immigration and refugee policies were of funda-
mental importance in connecting Canada more fully to this
larger system. Profound policy changes after the mid-rg6os
led to major changes in the countries of origin of migrants
and refugees. Initial changes opened the door to Third
World immigrants; later changes opened the door to Third
World refugees.
3 Some Latin American migrants in the rg?os and rgSos -
specifically, refugees fleeing American-backed military gov-
ernments in the region 
- 
knew they would not be officially
g Ecommic and Social Prrog:es k Lat;n America (IAlashington: Inter-American
Ilevelopment BanL 1988).
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welcome in the United States. Consequently, they sought ref-
uge in secondary destinations, such as Canada, Europe, and
even Australia, where individuals and lobby groups s''mpa-
thetic to their case welcomed them. The favoured alternative
destinations were those which combined a safe haven and
economic opportunity.
4 Information on Canada as a possible destination flowed back
to Latin America from those who originally came and led to
the movement of relatives and other migrants, including
those from other Latin American countries who had not yei
established a migration path to Canada. Migrant networks in
the inter-American sJ6tem as elsewhere are facilitated by the
greater ease and declining costs of travel and telecommuni-
cations.
These circumstances may all be interpreted as consistent with
a moie general model of the recent functioning of a regional
social, economic, and political system. The United States, as the
dominant and wealthiest actor, has established varied and
expanding cultural, economic, and political linls to other
nations in the s)'stem. The system is much like a wheel, with the
United States at the hub and all other nations connected to it via
spokes. The system has served to benefit the hub country, but
countries at the ends of the spokes have also profited, dthough
in a more variable pattern. Canada, as a closely aligned inter-
mediate power, gains enonnous advantages from its very close
proximity and strong ties to the United States. Correspondingly,
Canada and the nations in Latin America have not in general
felt the need to establish many linl$ with one another, even
though there is a loug history of Canadian trade with and invest-
ment in certain Latin American countries.6 The other nations in
the qntem are linked in diverse but less privileged wa)ls to the
United States, and their economic and political conditioru reflect
these circumstanc€s.
6J.C.M. Ogcbbn Gringosfmm the Far North:f,'crrts onthc Hdstory of Carudhn-
Latk ,/ltrrricaa Rclations $66 1968 (Toronto: Macmillen 1976).
Canada's privileged position has created a curious mix of
dependency on the United States and limited but important pol-
icy independence from it. Understanding this mix is crucial to
understanding Canadian immigration policies and trends. In the
geopolitical arena, Canada tends to follow major American pol-
icies fairly closely. At the same time, rising levels of income and
different historical traditions have led Canada (under both Lib-
eral and Conservative governments) to develop distinctive social
policies in areas such as immigration and asylum. On a per cap-
ita basis, Canada accepts far more immigrants than the United
States, and refugees in recent yea$ have formed a higher pro-
portion of the inflow of international migrants to Canada. Can-
ada has also shown a greater openne$i to refugees from right-
*i.g dictatorships and repression. These distinctive features of
Canada's policy are esseptial in explaining the country's emerg-
ing role in the hemispheric migration system.
As noted earlier, Latin Americans have reacted to economic
crisis and political turmoil and violence at home by increasingly
seeking jobs and security in the United States. They have also
moved to Canadt, ts a'next best' North American destination,
particularly if access to the United States has been perceived to
be difficult or insecure, as has been the case for refugees fleeing
dictatorships and military regimes backed or viewed favourably
by the United States. Other Latin American migration flows to
Canada 
- 
such as those involving family reunification and the
movement of skilled professionals from countries where they face
poor economic prospects 
- 
are important as well, but they also
reflect broader dynamics in the hemispheric system, including
limited access to the United States and 'spillover' opportunities
in Canada.
Taking into account all these factors, it seems fair to say that
the migration stream from Latin America to Canada aros€ on
the foundation of a combination of special circumstances: vio-
lence in sending countries; variable barriers to migrant entry to
the United States; an independent Canadian immigration and
refugee pohcy; and relatively high income and employment
opportunitic in Canada. This is, therefore, a system subject to
changc wben circumstances shift, as they s6em to be doing at the
prcEcnt time. Let us look more clmely at the these forces influ-
cncing migration flows in the inter-American q/stem and on the
of current trends for Canada.
Cnnr atd exodus
Thc crisis of the late rgTos and the rgSos in Latin America was
a mixture of severe economic downturn and associated political
and social turmoil. In some countries the crisis was associated
with authoritarian government, armed conflict, or insurgency.
Whilc these dimsnsisns of the cr'lsis were independent of one
another, they often coincided in specific countries and years.
With the economic, political, and social aspects of crisis so inter-
twined, it is often difficult to assess which dimension is most
resporisible for the rising migrant exodus from the region. Two
hypothcses seem generally congruent with the evidence.
First, economic crisis has provided a general background for
population exodus. Certain groups, particularly professionals
and skilcd workers, have moved internationally largely for eco-
nomic neasong. The economic factor by itseH, however, accounts
for very little Latin American migration to Canada (although it
undoubtedly accounts for a good deal of Latin American mlgra-
tion to the United States). Second, large flows of Latin American
worken and peasants to Canada have emerged primarily from
countries where civil war and reprecsion are taking a major toll
on life and freedom. In such cas€s, the relative advantages of
Canada with regard to.lrbs, income, and social services become
important supporting features in directing the initial migration
flow to Canada, and in sustaining a later trailing flow of relatives
and cher migrants. However, the most decisive attraction of
Cenade for them was its independent policy with respect to ref-
ugses: thse fl*ittg right-wing dictatorships in Chile, El Salva-
dor, and other Latin American countries found a relatively wel-
coning environment in Canada.
The emerging migration bridge from Latin America to Can-
ada can best be understood from the perspective of tbe mallr
international population movements in the Americas, and of
how Canada, which was not a part of this system before 1969,
has recently become an increasingly important player in it.
Three points define some major features of international popu-
lation flows in the Americas. Stated briefly, these are: (r) the
United States it by far the most important migrant destination;
(e) the largest flows in the hemisphere, such as the movement of
Mexicans to the United States and the movement of Colombians
to Venezuela, are between contiguous natio$; and (3) themigra-
tion bridge from Latin America to Canada has emerged in
exceptional circumstances where local violence and international
politics combined to make Canada an important secondary des-
tination in the s)'stem.
Considering all Latin American sources, the United States is
by far the most important single destination for inter-American
migrants. For those in Cuba, the Dominican Republic. Dd Mex-
ico, it is virtually the sole destination. Data from censuscs taken
around rgSo indicate, for example, that more than go per cent
of all people who had emigrated from these tbree countries to
another country in the hemisphere were living in the United
States (table r). For many other countries, the p€rcentage of its
emigrants in the United States reached 8o per cent or more. In
the few cases where the United States was not the main destina-
tion, it was the second most important destination. C,orresPond'
ing figures from the rggo round of censuses are not yet available
but will likely show a similar pattern, with one important shift:
large numbers of migrants fleeing violence in Central America
have gone to neighbouring countries in the region in the r98os,
even though the United States remains the major destination
(table z). In slun, while the reasons for leaving home vary from
one country to another, the preferred destination is the same:
geaerally, those who can gain admission to the United States seek
to do so.
Tabk I Enigraau from Letin American countrica rcAi*ercd in othcr countries in the
Amcricer, circa l9B0
Country of origin
Emigranr in
other counuies
(thoruan&)
Principal
degtination
Secondary
destination
Mcrico
Colombia
Ghile
Panguay
Brazil
Aryrntina
Bolivia
Uruguay
El Salvador
Ecuador
Fenr
Nicaragua
Panama
Guetemala
Hondurii
Vwuela
Cocta Rica
USA
Ven
Arg
Arg
.. 
Para
USA
Ars
Arg
USA
USA
USA
c.R.
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
{s8%)
(75%)
(68%)
(sBVo)
(6%)
(t3%)
(74%'
(70%)
(76%)
(75%')
(55%)
(47%)
(88%)
(e6%)
(82%)
(85%)
(8r%,
usA (sl%)
usA (12%)
Braz (6%,
ArC $97o)
Pata (21/6)
usA (s%)
Braz (15/6)
Guet (r4%)
Ven (r9%)
Ven (ZLfi)
c.R. 
_(7%\
2,218
673
t04
28t
2r4
tl0
r56
155
123
l14
100
98
6E
68
47
39
36
Guat (1116)
Ars (4%)
Pan (9%)
SoURCE: cELADE, 'Invertigaci6n de la migraci6n internacional en Latinoam€ica,' Boletin
Demogrdfbo 19, no 37 adjusted with data from the 1981 cenrus of Canada
(Staticticr Canada, l98l Ceruur of Canada, placc of birth, citizcnship, period of
inmigration, Ottawa 1984).
Among the major flows between contiguous nations, that
from Mexico to the United States is by far the largest interna-
tional movement of people in the Americas. During the r97os
and r98os Mexicans continued to move to the United States in
large numbers. A rise in the numhr of undocumented Mexican
migrants apprehended in the United States was relprted for the
period immediately after a major currency devaluation and the
clear onset of economic crisis in Mexico in rg8z.z Yet it is not
clear whether total emigration from Mexico to the United States
over the period r98o-go (a time of prolonged and deep economic
crisis in Mexico) was any greater than one would expect based
7 Frmt Bcan, C'coqgcs,Vcrncz, and Charlcc B. Keely, Opening and Closing tte
Door: Eulutkg Immigtation Refon and Control (Santa Monica ce and
Werhington: RAND and tlrc Urban kutitute rgSg).
Table 2 Refugeer and dirplaced Fnons from and in Central America, circa 1987
Country of
rcsidence
Nationality
Salvadorean Guatemalan Nicaragu.an Totek
Refugees
United States
Mexico
Canada
Central Amcrica
Total refugees
Displaced penotu
5fi),0fi) to
850,000
120,fi)O to
250,000
22,283
5l,700
693,983 to
1,175,985
500,000
100,000 to
200,000
45,000 to
150,000
7,326
7,700
160,026 to
565,026
Ifil,fiX) to
250,000
40,fi)0 to
80,m0
N/A
7,081
67,7fi) to
163,?00
ll4,78l to
250,781
250,000
640,flD to
I,130,fi10
165.fiX! to
4{n,mo
36,690
12?,lfi!to
223,Ifi)
968,790 ro
1,789,790
850,fi)0 to
1,000,m0
souRCE: Estimatcs for Central American refugees in the United States, Mexico, and
neighbouring countric in thcir own region from Liica North and CAPA, cd!,
Between War and Peue in Centnl America (Toronto: Bctween the Liner 1990),
table v r t . Estimatc for Central American refugece in Canada from epecial
tabulations of immigrants arriving in thc Refugce Clars and Refugte Claimanc
provided by Employment and Immigration Canada.
NorE; Refupes are defined as emigrants (living abroad) who have claimed or would wish
to claim political asylum. Displaced persons are thoce who have fled thcir home duc
to war or violence, but who remain in their owrr countrics.
on.the historical trend line.8 It may be that Mexican migration
to the United States functions primarily on the basis of long-term
historical differences in employment opportunity combined with
established social nerworks which link Mexican workers to
friends, relatives, and jobs in the United States. Short-term
downturns in the Mexican economy, even when they are as dra-
matic iN that in the perid after 1982, may have some impact,
8 See, for example, the data on legal migrants pmcntd by Percy Krdy and War'
ren: Ellen Fercy lkdy and Robcrt lAlarrtrr, 'Dcmographic dimcnsioos of southern
migration to and from the United States sinc€ the r97os,' ia hoceedings of the
Confercnce on thc Peopling of thc Americas (Li.ge, Bclgium: Internationd
Union for thc Scientific Study of Population rggr), vol r, chap 17.
but it is largely an acceleration of the growth in an dready large
flow.
Thesecond largest international population movement in the
Americas is the flow from Colombia to Venezuela. Economic
crisis in the rg7os played an important role in stimulating this
movement. Most migrants w€re agricultural workers who left
regions of rural unemployment in easterr Colombia to go to
more abundant and better paid agricultural jobs in Venezuela,
following a long established pattern.e The movement was
undoubtedly accelerated in the rgTos and r98os by widespread
economic crisis in Coltimbia, particularly the combination of
falling agricultural employment and a decline in construction
and other alternative urban employment for surplus rural work-
ers. Rising armed conflict between the army and both insurgents
and i[icit drug traders in the context of widespread terrorism
instigated by the latter groups seerns to have had little impact on
this international movement. In fact, internal population move-
ments in Colombia are often paradoxically directed towards
zones of conllict and violence because they are also areas of
Iucrative drug trade and spin-off commerce.'o
Beginning in the mid-rg7os and continuing into the early
rgSos there was a very large flow of Uruguayans into Argentina
and Brazil. Indeed, following the onset of rising unemployment,
inflation, falling incomes, and a military takeover of the state in
rg?3, Uruguayans left in such large numbers that the population
of the country actually shrank and the age structure shifted dra-
matically because most of those who left were young workers."
g Gabriel Murillo, Mi3rlu,t t Wo*crs in the Americas: A Compmtiu Stdy of
Migllat*n bctucm Colombia atd Venczueh atrld bctuecn Me*ho and tlp United
$tctan, monograph 13 (LaJolla: Ccnter for U.S.-Mexican Studies, Univenity of
California at San Dicto, rgEl); Adela Fellegrino, Migraciin intenaciatul de
Latiwma*:anos cn Las Anhicas (Santiago, Chile: Gentro Latinoamericano de
Dwgrafre, circe rg87), 97-g).
ro Gebricl Murillo and Marta Herrrra, Vblcncc onil Migntion in Colombia, Policy
Brief g ffa$ingt@: Hcmispberic Migration Proi\ct, Ccnter;61 [nnmigration
Folict rd ncfrgeeesftance, C,corgetwn Univcnity, rggr).
rr Juan Carlc.Fortunl Ndb Nic.drorol, ed Adcle Felhgrino, Emigracidn ilc
thttguaraos, Cota&rs m cl Ertcrbr y hrspcaius dc Rctono, tlocumento dc
This movement has been ascribed primarily to the onset of a
dramatic economic crisis at home in the context of substantially
greater economic opportunity across the border in Argentina
and Brazil, two countries with whom Uruguay had close migFa'
tory and coilrmercial linkages. Uruguay had achieved levels of
social development and the benefits of an advanced welfare
state, and the system began to unravel with falling exports and
economic stagnation. The rise of a military govemment was a
key factor in the timing. The jailing of large numbers of dissi-
dents and the repression of political activities led directly to sig-
nificant out-movement of dissidents and others. Yet, the majority
of emigrants were not members of any particular repressed polit-
ical movement, but rather people who had lost employment and
income.
Large-scale migrations between other contiguous countries,
such as thoae between Cuba and the United States, Paraguay and
Argentina, and Brazil and Paraguay, have also been docu-
mented. All follow historically established migration and com'
mercial linkages. These may all be conrasted with the new
bridges betrueen Latin America and Canada. Previously there
rflere no migration links and only weak commercial ties benreen
Latin America and Canada. The migration linkages when they
emerged seemed to have little to do with pre-existing or devel-
oping corlmercial ties. Rather they were formed by flows of ref-
ugees fleeing violence and, to a lesser degree, by economic
migrants fleeing declining employment ProsPects. This move-
ment took place in a context in which opportunities to go to the
United States were restricted in some way while opportunities to
go to Canada were expanding. Migration bridges formed to Can-
ada from several Latin American countries, particularly Chile,
El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Yet such a bridge to Canada did
not emerge so clearly from Guatemala. These migrant linkages
are instructive.
Trabap rg7 (Montevidco: Centro de Informaciones y E*udios del Uruguay
r98?).
The exodus from Chile 
- 
to the United States, Europe, Can-
ada, and many other countries (Venezuela, Atrstrali") 
- 
followed
the Pinochet coup in rg?3 and was composed primarily of
migrants who were victims of the political change. While many
Chilean self-exiles and refugees went to the United States, others
could not do so because individuals who had supported a Marxist
govemment were not welcome and still others were reluctant to
go to there because of American support for the coup. It was at
this point, in rg74-b, that humanitarian groups in Canada
brought pre$sure to bear that induced shifts in Canadian policy
which led many Chileans to migrate to Canada (table 3).
A large flight of refugees from El Sahndor 
- 
to neighbouring
countries but also to the United States and to Canada 
- 
arose
immediately after a surge of repression, assassinatioru, and the
outbleak of civil war in rg?9. Those who left the country
included individuals targeted by death squads, yet most were
simply passive victirns of the conflict and violence in their com-
munities. Regardless of their reasons for leaving, the migrants
werre not generally viewed by the United States as bona fide ref-
uge€s because they were fleeing a country whose govenrment w:ur
supportd by the United States government." The implementa-
tion (in rg?8) of Canada's new immigration legislation (passed
in 1976) opened the way for Salvadorean refugees. Starting from
a trickle of only ro8 individuals in 1979, the flow to Canada had
become a sizeable strezrm of.2,967 migrants by 1989. The num-
bers continued to rise annually through the r98os to reach 4,Dgo
migrants in rggo (table f). In total, some z6,ooo Salvadoreans
moved to Canada between January rgTg and December r9go,
slightly more than the number of Chileans migrating to Canada
between 1973 and rggo (table 4).
A near civil war has been under way in Guatemah for more
than a decade. Guatemalaru have moved to Canada, but the
rc T.A. Aleinikoff, United States refirgee policy: past, prarcnt and future,' paper
prcceated at th confercnce, 'Migration, Human Rightc and Economic Integra-
tion,'YorL, Univeniry Toronto, November rggr.
Tablc 3 Latin Amcrican migrant landings and refugrc claimant regirtratioru in Canade,
by ycar
Country of birth r966-?g 1974-80 r98l-5 1986-90 Total
Immigrunts'
Aryentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Mcxico
Nicatagu.a
Peru
Other countries
TOTAL
Refugee cbittuntsl
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guaternala
Mexico
Nicaragua
Peru
Clther countries
TOTAL
Immigranu plus
claimants
2,990.
2,t43
t,048
xo,?74
39,r55
4,5t7
r,733
14,846
4,418
6,r68
1,059
I,ll5
4,235
148
2,497
5,340
46,074
t,72?
E09
4,C03
t,424
950
9,122
2,168
2,381
735
t,742
2,969
27,530
84
2S
372
22
l9
897
198
l2
68
261
363
2,325
29,855
2,614 1t,848
2,286 7,171
5,352 24,&l
2,091 7.933
1,688 8,806
16,414 26,595
4,8t4 8,ll7
4,656 14,318
4,153 5,036
5,?ffi 9,945
4,924 4t,307
54,718
2,448
2,t21
2,660
25r
298
9,585
3,143
676
4,953
90r
6,509
33,520
t67,477
2,527
2,150
3,032
273
3r7
r0,482
3,341
688
5,001
I,162
6,872
35,E45
39,155 46,074 88,258 243,t22
souRCE: Special tabulationr provided by Employment and Immigration Canada.
* Includes refugees ollicially celccted ouaide Canada. Prior to 1974 the data on landings
from many Latin American oountrier were classifred together in a "othcr Latin American
countrier" carcgory.
t RcfuSec claimantc are migranb who arrive in Canada as visiton and claim asylum from
within thc country. Therc data began to be collected in 1984.
numbers are relatively small compared with those for Chile and
El Salvador (table S). Why? The Guatemalan military within
the context of ia repression of civil and political rights and its
fight against insurgents, slaughtered thousands of civilians in
indigenous communities in the rgTos and r98os. This violence
sparked the flight of thousands of people to neighbouring coun-
tries, principdly to Mexico.'r The majority of the refugees were
meurbers of indigenous communities, with very strong ties to
their ancestral lands, and with cultural and linguistic ties to their
home regions. They stayed in southern Mexico, close to Guate-
mala, because they had every expectation of returning home.
Other migration flows to Canada from Latin America since
1966 reflect in varying degrees the circumstances which led peo-
ple to leave their homes, and the alternative destinations open to
them, Middle-class and 6lite Nicaraguans who went inro exile to
fight against the Sandinista government mostly went to the
United States, where they were welcomed. Those Nicaraguans
who later came to Canada, in contrast, were primarily individu-
als fleeing violence and the attendant economic collapse of the
countr brought about by warfare and the American trade
embargo. These individuals included people fleeing the.Conrra
war (or in the case of young men, individuals who did not want
to be conscripted into the Nicaraguan anny for a war in which
they did nbt believe). Smaller flows to Canada from Argentina,
Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru in the rg7os and rgSos may
be viewed as a spillover into Canada of larger flows to the United'
States in periods of turmoil in these counrries (table 3).
Camdian policits
The migration bridger from Latin America to Canada cannot be
understood without taking into account changes in Canadian
policy since the mid-rg6os. The initial turning potnt was in 1965
when the ethnocentric and implicitly racist policies of the
rg Liira f{cth and CAPA, eds, Bctwcet War atlld hacc in Cmtml Ameica:
Chohastm M (Toronto: Between the Lines rggo).
national preference EEtem were dropped, a policy approach
which had given high priority to admitting Europearu while vir-
tually excluding Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans. A sec-
ond related change was the establishment, in 1968, of a points
s)'stem to select immigrants who best meet 'adaptability criteria'
defined largely in terms of their knowledge of French or English,
job skills, age, and schooling. Race, religion, and national origin
were no Ionger considerations in selection.'{ These changes
opened the door to a massive shift in Canadian immigration pat-
terns: migrants from the Third World soon became the domi-
nant $rouP.'o
The third policy change was the revised Immigration Act of
1976 (implemented fully in rg78) which introduced, for the first
time, the distinct category 'refugee' into the classification of
immigrants and clarified Ganadian obligations with respect to
refugees.'6 Historically, Canada had eFn.r little attention to ref-
ugees as such.'z Those flecing persecution abroad or seeking asy-
lum in Canada were admitted if they were alsci seen to lit immi-
gration criteria with respect to their work skills and perceived
social adaptability. Thus, during the expansion of the West when
Canada sought to settle agricultural lands, Doukhobors and
Mennonites were admitted not so much because they were seek-
rng asylum from religious penecution but because they were
farmers and because they were white, Christian, and European.
Conversely, Jews who needed asylum in the late rgSos were
excluded regardless of their refugee status primarily because of
religious intolerarrce in Canada'E and also because immigrants of
14 Freda Hawhins, Critical Yearc in Immigmlion: Catufu and Austrclb Comfured
(znd ed; King;ston & Montred: McGill-Queen's University Press t99t).
15 Alan Sinmons, The origin and characteristics of "new wave" Canadian immi
grants,'in S.S. Halli, F. Trovato, and L. Ihiedger, eds, Ethnic Demogrcphy:
Cawdian Immigm*, Racdal atd Cultuml Yardatiots (Ottawa: Carleton Univer.
eity Prers r99o), 14r-6o.
16 Basok and Simmons, 'A rwiew of the politics of Canadian refugee selcction.'
r7 Gerald E. Dirlis, Camfu\ Refugee fuEcy: Indiffetence or Oppoilunennl (Mon-
tred & Kingrtou: McCill-Queen'r Unirrcrsity Prtas 1977).
r8 Iwing Abella and Harold Troper, Notu Is Too Many: Camda atd thcJcws of
Ewope rggg-rg4E (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys r98e).
any kind wene unwelcome to Canada in the flepression. Hungar-
ian forestry experrc and studena fleeing the 19g6 Soviet invasion
were welcomed because Canada wanted skilled workers, because
t}eywere Europeans, and because theywere fleeingfrom a coun-
try perceived as'the enemy' in a Cold War context.
Ghanges in Canadian refugee practices and policies emerged
gradually, in a somewhat piecemeal fashion at first. A significant
shift took place when Canada began to admit refugees from out-
side Euro1rc on the basis of criteria which were independent of
Cold War politics. This fint took place in the case of some 7,ooo
Ugandans of Asian descent who came to Canada beginning in
r97r after their expulsion by Idi Amin. They were admitted
because Britain asked for the assistance of other Commonwealth
nations in accommodating this group.'g That the migrants spoke
English, had relatively high levels of schooling, and possessed
useful corrmercid and work skills did not hurt their caliln or
require any reversal of Canada's historically established policy of
favouring such people.
Chilean refugees provided the second major case in which
Canada responded to Third World asylum seekers. This case was
exceptional in many respects. In contrast to the case of the Ugan-
dan Asians, where Canada essentially responded to eiternal
enconragernent from a major international partner, the Chileans
were accepted largely because of pressure from domestic labour
and human rights groups.'o The Liberal government of the time,
following the lead of the United States, had been antagonistic to
the socialist govemment of Salvador Allende, and both Canada's
ambassador to Chile and its s€cretary of state for external affairs
were reportd to have been pleased by the Pinochet coup. There
was therefore little official sympathy for Chileans seeking asylum
at the level of the cabinet or senior bureaucrats. Adoption of a
policy favourable 6 Chilean asylum seckers arose months later
as evidence emerged of the brutality of the Pinochet dictatorship
rg Dirlr, Catuda's Refugce hlirl; Hawtinr, Cfitical Yean in ImnigWion.
ro Basol, 'Latin Amrican refugee movements and thc cenadian rctlnnrc'; Haw-
vim, Critical Ycars in Immigwtion, fig.
Table 4 Annual arrivab of Chilean inrmigrana and refugce
claimantc to Canada
Year
Immigrants
(including
rdugeer)
Refugec
claimanu from
within Canada
1974
l9?5
t976
t977
1978
1979
l9E0
r98l
1982
l98t
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
TOTAL
2,104
3,12?
2,776
2,249
2,O23
1,310
t,257
I,081
I,108
7W
683
541
640
1,461
955
l,006
I,290
24,44L
159
233
708
1,548
l8l
l9l
232
5,032
2,IIX
3,127
2,776
2,249
2,023
1,310
t,257
1,081
I, roE
?90
822
774
1,348
2,809
1,136
l, t97
1,522
27,433
souRCE: Special tabulatioru provided by Employment and Immi-
gration Canada.
NorE: Refugees are migrants who arrive in Canada with an official
immigration authorization ba*d on their claim for asylum.
Refugee claimants arrive in Canada as visiton and then
claim asylum. Such claims are subjected to an official review
to determine thcir legitimacy. Data on refugee claimants
were not syrstematically recorded prior to 1984. Arrival dates
shovm for claimants are in fact the year in which they regis-
tered their claim.
and as various concerned groups in Canada put pressure on the
government. The total flow of migrants from Chile to Canada
was signilicant in t974, peaked in rg7g, remained large until
rg?8, then declined gradually until rg8b, after which it roae
somewhat again (table +). In the early years, the flow consisted
mostly of refugees but in later years many were family class
migrants sponsored by those earlier arrivals.
Chilean asylum seekers had not been expelled (as were the
Ugandan Asiatr*), nor rvere they to be found in refugee camgr
(as were, later, the Vietnamese). Canada had therefore to estab-
lish criteda to identify which of the Chileans who wished to emi-
grate fell into the category of refugee. The selection was made,
as far aE can be determined, purely on criteria related to justifi-
able fear of persecution, with little or no reference to labour
force skitls. This may have been the first instance in which Can-
ada accepted refugees without any implied or overt economic
calculus or any encouragement from a major international ally.
The Chilean experience was followed in rg7b by a special
programme to admit Vietnamese refugees. Canada, responding
to a call to solidarity among Western nations after the fall of
Saigon, offered to take a share of the Vietnamese refugees. As in
the case of the Chilean refugees, economic considerations appear
to have been irrelevant to the overdl decision to admit the Viet-
nam€se. Yet, unlike the Chilean case, the Vietnamese who came
to Canada were in the end selected by Canadian officials, using
social adaptability criteria (including work skills) from a larger
population of refugees living in camps in Thailand or elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. Thus, a high proportion of the Vietnamese
who were admitted to Canada were young males with better lev-
els of schooling, while thoce who remained behind were dispro-
portionately female and less well educated."'
Following this piecemeal response to refugees from Chile and
Vietnam, Canada passed a revised Immigration Act in which for
the first time 'refugees' were defined as a separate class of immi-
grants. Based on the new legislation, Canada was increasingly
open to considering the clairns of individual refugees on the mer-
its of the specific case. Programmes to select refugees abroad
were gradually established in countries such as El Salvador and
Guatemda where individuals were under threat.
The early rgSos brought new challenges to Canadian refugee
policy. Reflecting a world-wide rise in refugee flows, large num'
bers of individuals b.guo to ariive in Europe and North America
rr Bd end $immonr, 'A rwio of tlre politic of Canadian refugee aelection.'
from various parts of the world, claiming refugee statur. Cana-
dian procedures to determine the merits of the many diverse
claims were cumbersomi, disputed, and potentidly unfair.
Uncertainty and lack of proce$lng capacity led to a large back-
log of claimants whase ca!rcs had not been reviewed. Efforts to
reduce that backlog resulted in general amnesties (called'admin-
istrative reviews') for large numbers of undocumented foreign
migrants. After much rancorous public and parliamentary
debate on how to deal fairly with refugee claimants already in
Canada, a new refugee determination system was implementd
in January rg8g." In the early p€riod of its olrcration, the new
system sought to avoid tragrc errors by admitting most claim-
ants.tt
Salvadoreans rvere one of a number of refugee groupc which
became important in the debate leading up to the new proce-
dures for dealing with claimants, largely because they arrived in
two streams: one composed of individuals selected abroad by
Canadian of{icials, and the other of individuals who arrived to
make an asylum claim from within the country (table 5). The
latter flow was spurred in 1986 when the United States enactd
a new Immigration Reforrn and Control Act, which included a
provision to sanction employers of undocnmentd. alien workers
and strengthened provisions to repatriate 'illegal' migrants. Sal-
vadoreans fleeing war and repression from their own military
government which was broadly supported by the United States
were not welcome. The policy debate in Canada in the rgSos
over refugee claimants was influenced by the Salvadorean case,
among others, because this case suppoftd the argurnents of
those who felt that pushing for tighter controls to ensure that all
refugees would be selected abroad was unrealistic and, more
importantly, that such procedures creatd grave risks for those
rr Alan Simmons and Khran l(cohane, 'Canadian immigratioa policy rtatc stratc-
gb and tlrc quc* for legitinacy,' Cardian Raicu of Soc&,bg and Auhtold'
oggr rg(Nomber rggr), 4rt-6r.
r3 Alan Simmons, 'Immigretbn: pnessrc m thc qfstem,' Hwrlrlnn€ftrs Forum(fa[ rggo),4-5.
Tablc 5 Annuel erriveb of Selvedoreen immigranr end refugce
deimenu toC;enade
Ycar
Refugec
cleirnang from
within Canada
478
419
t42
4,510
l,6l?
I,136
2,t80
10,4E2
soURcE:'Spccid tabulations provided by Employment and
lmnitration Canade.
NoTE: RcfugEGr ele migrana vho arrivc in Canada with an offrcial
immigntion eutborizxion bered on their claim for arylum.
Rcfiryee cleimenr errivc in Canada as visitors aod tbcn
cleim arylurn. Such cleimr are subi.cted to an offrcial revierr
to dctcrrinc their legitimacT. Data on refugee clairnanr
rr?rc rxrt ryltem.dcrllt rccordcd pdor to lg&{. Arrival datcr
sbown for chimentr are in fact thc year in which they rcgis-
tcrcd thcir claim.
Immigrentr
(iacluding
refugcer)
1974
1975
r976
l9??
r97t
1g79
1980
l9El
r982
l9E3
r9&{
1985
r9t6
lgtlt
1988 '
l9E9
1990
TOTAL
23E
179
l9a
tzl
105
r08
ll0
292
891
2,,567
2,63E
2,7t4
t,060
3,{93
2.714
2,E57
,1,290
26,595
238
179
192
t27
105
108
lr0
292
891
2,567
t,l16
3,153
t,202
8,001
4,t31
3,993
6,470
37,O77
An impoftant issue
evidence that Canada
in the refug€e claimant debate was the
was faced with 'bqgus claims' 
- 
that is,
legrtirnately fleeing violence and periecution in cases where other
countri€s wene not sJrmpathetic to their plight.
requests for asyhim from visitors who claimed persecution on rhe
basis of spurioru if not false consideratioru. The mosr celebrated
casc wils perhap8 that of Portuguece visitors requesring asylum
ba!€d on the argument that Portugal pcrsccutd Jehovah's Wit-
ncxses. Several planeloads of Brazilian asylnm seekers were also
detained and sent home.
Migrants to Canada from Peru are not officially recognized
by Canadian authorities as refugees, but they are surely'refugee-
like,'gtu"o the rising violence and insecurity in their home coun-
try which contributes to the desire of Peruvians to emigrate. Not
surprisinglf, rrany of those coming from Peru see themselves as
refugees, but under Canadian policy these migrans are generally
admitted only if they meet the criteria for becoming an inde-
pendent (economic) migrant or if ihey have close relatives in
Canada who can sponsor them under the family reunification
provisions of immigration law. Even under these restrictions,
however, the number of Peruvians moving to Canada since the
mid-r98os has been rising (table g).
Altenwtiue datirutions
As noted above, Canada is at best a tertiary destination for Latin
American emigrans, even among those who have come in large
numbers. Latin Americans have come to Canada in substantid
numbers when access to the United States, the preferred place of
destination, has been difficult or problematic. Thus, more Chi-
lean emigrants went to the United States after the Pinochet coup
than to any other single destination, but lack of receptivity on the
part of the American government combined with resentment of
the United States among Chilean refugees for its complicity in the
economic collapse of the Allende government and allegations that
the Centrd Intelligence Agency had participated actively in plan-
ning the coup itself led those seeking refuge abroad to be wary of
the United States. They therefore took advantage of asylum offers
from other countries, such as Canada (but also many countries in
Europe), where there was organized sympathy for their plight.
Similarly, while large numbers of Salvadoreans went to
neighbouring countries, those who have sought refuge farther
afield have gone primarily to the United States: in 1987, it is
estimated that between boo,ooo and 85o,ooo Salvadoreans were
resident in the United States. The g7,ooo Salvadoreans who have
corre to Canada since rg?g is a significant number, but small
relatirrc to thooe who have stayed in neighbouring countries or
ggne to the United Statet (tables r and z). Probably few Salva-
dorcans would have come to Canada at all, had the United States
bccn mone open to accepting their claims for asylum. Indeed,
nrany of thoee who did come to Canada had been living clandes-
tincly in thc United States and moved north only when the new
American immigration policies introduced in 1986 increased the
risk of them being deported to El Salvador. Table 5 shorvs a very
large jump in Canadian refugee claimants from El Salvador in
rg8? as the new policy came into effect.
Mig'mn tutamhs
Once a migration stream has been established by r few trail-
btazing pioneers, other relatives, friends, and members of the
same cultural cornnunity will tend to follow. The migrant chain
will normdly continue until conditions in the home country
improve or thoe in the receiving country decline, relatively
speaking. Many of thooe who follow come as sponsored kin while
others come as independent (economic) migrants, not as refu-
83c8.
Consider, for example, the initial Chilean refugee stream and
the trail of migration which ensued (table +). The movement
from Chile to Canada surged in the p€rid rg?b-8 when Cana-
dian policy finally shifted to accept the refugee status of asylum
ceekers from that country. The surge reflected a backlog of jailed
and other threatened individuals who had not found an alterna-
tive destination. Iluring the early rg8os, the number of Chileans
to Canada 
- 
more of whom were sponsored kin of pre-
viors refugees 
- 
dalined to less than one-fifth the peak inflow
achietad in '1975, zugesting that the stream was gradually
becoming exhausted. Then, surprisingly, numbers began to rise
again during the'late rg8os, returning to nearly 1,3@ arrivals in
rggo. This nacent rise in Chilean migration to Canada is some-
whet ruprfoiag as it coincides with the retunr to democratic gov-
crnmcnt in Chile and with a period in which Chilean economic
growth had become solidly pooitive. Yet, on reflection, it may be
]quite coruistent with the evolution of the inter-American system.
Unemployment and a very uneren distribution of income is evi-
dent in Chile during its recent recovery. As the events in posnrar
Europe showed, the early stagcs of a return to political stability
and to economic growth can also generate pre$ures for high
levels of emigration.
One might also note that the smaller stre?rn of migrants from
Argentina to Canada shows a similar unexpectd continuity and
recent revival. Argentineans came to Canada in small but signif-
icant numbers (around r,o(x) per year) in rgTg-4 during a period
of emerging domestic violence and repression (benreen Tupa-
maro$ and the nilitary) and deepening economic crisis just after
the military government took over in 1976.'r Subsequently, the
flow of emigrants frorn Argentina to Canada dropped to lower
levels, with fewer than zoo immigrants in 1985, the year that
dernocratic government was reinstated. In rg9o, a year in which
Argentina was again facing a major economic crisis, the figure
rose again, to 85o migrants. Various Latin American countries
show small increases in t}e number of emigrants to Canada in
the late r98os; together these countries account for a total
annual inllow of something over ro,ooo migrants.
DISCUSSION
How will the inter-Ameriqm system shape future migration pat-
terns, and where will Canada fit within the tystem? Among ttre
factors which will influence the ansyrers to thm questions ale fivc
important one$: the North American Free Trade Agreemenq the
state of peace and dernocracy in Central America; the potentid for
new insu{g€nqf and violence; changEs in C,anadhs irnrnigration
and refugee policy; and the general trcnd towards globalization.
The North Annican Free Tmde Agreement
Optimistic scenarioo of the future impact of the proposed agree'
ment on North American Free Trade (xerre) suggest that the
14 Adriana Manhall, 'F-itletim of Argurtincans to thc Unitd Statcl,'in Peuicie
R.. Ferrar, d, Whcn Borde?5 Don't Dfui&: Lobor llligration ad Rcfrycc Mottc'
rlnd*s h thc Amcricts (New Yorl: Ce'ntcr for Migration Studier IgEE)' rrg'4r.
effects on emplgyment and economic growth may be slightly pos-
itive in the United States and Canada, and sharply positive in
Mexico, leading to rising opportunities in Mexico for Central
American migrants. In contrast, pessimistic assessments suggest
a deterioration in labour conditions and rising unemployment in
Canada and the United States, with an expansion of low-wage
labour in Mexico as international capital comes to dominate
labour in the entire bloc. It is also apparent that the Nerre will
force an end to Mexican agriculturd subsidies (particularly those
benefiting snall-scale farmers) and lead to a rising tide of unem-
ployed agric-ultural workers in'Mexico, who will in turn force
down national wages for unskilled worken and perhaps acceler-
ate the emigration of farrr workers into the United States. These
hypothetical scenarios cannot yet be tested, so the possible
impact of the NAFTA on migration in the inter-American sJFtem
must for the moment remain a speculative question.
kace atd demafiac! in Centml Amnica
The prospects for a lasting return to peace and democracy in
C,entral Arnerica are positive but still unceftain. The war in Nic-
aragua is over and a democratic government is in place; yet there
are increasing signs that the sopial and political conllicts which
led to violence in the first place are not being resolved and may
Iead to renewed armed struggle. The country's economy was vir'
tually destroyed by the war, and few exiles seem eager to return
becarrse of the uncertainty regarding both economic and politicd
conditions. The recent tmce and greater democracy in El Salva'
dor are also heartening, but the economic and political future of
the country remains unclear. Out-migration continues and refu'
gees in Honduras show little eagerness to return. Large numbers
of Guatemalan refugees who have been lioit g acro$ the border
in Mexico are preparing to rieturn home, however, because inter'
netiond assistance for them is drying up and because they have
been able, with the hdp of variour international organizations,
to ertract guarante€s of safety from the Guatemalan state. They
are retuming to communities which ar€ aE pgor, if not poorer, as
when they left. Th.y have no indication that there will bc siguif-
icant economic aid or that the conflict between the military and
dissidene which was associated with their previoru persecution
has been settled. Most importantly, the issue of the restricted
access of small farmers to land has not been resolved. In sum,
even if matters improve somewhat, Central America does not
seem to be a region which will draw many exiles back from North
America; it is also a zone from which a stream of emigrants may
continue to depart to the United States and Canada.
New inwrgmcy and violmce
While the general trend in Latin America over the past decade
has been towards a net reduction in authoritarian government
and violence, there are counter-trends. Peru is still a dernocratic
country but one operating under a susperuion of certain features
of the constitution while facing terrorism by the Sendero Lumi-
noso and a rising armed struggle between d*g producers and
the military in eastern Peru. These political circumstances and
the severe economic crisis in that country over the past decade
together create a situation from which many Peruvians would
like to depart. While Canada does not recognize those departing
as refugees, migration from Peru to Canada is nevertheless
increasing, although the numbers are still small.
Clwnging Codhn foHcy
Canadian immigration and refugee policy continues to evolve.
Bill c-84, implemented in the winter of rg8g, contained various
provisions intended to cunail the inllow of refugee claimants.
Subsequently, the refugee processing procedures in this bill were
srengthened through i gteater budget allocation to the institu'
tions responsible, and rates of rejection have be,en climbing for
claimants from certain countries. However, few of those whoce
claims have been rejected have been deported: most are appeal'
ing, and in the end many may be able to stay because they have
children born in Canada or jobs and other ties which will allow
them to remain. The mtx* recent legislation, bill c-86, passed in
the autumn of rg9r, may have serious implications for Latin
American refugee claimants in North America. It allows the
Caaadian government to n%otiate agreements with other coun-
tries which wil preyent claimants who have been refused enrry
in one country to apply in the other. Such an agreement between
Canada and the United States, for example, could severely
restrict the optioru of Central American refugee claimants. If
rcjected in Canada or the United States, the claimants would
have no basis for a second chance in the other country. These
restrictive efforts are intended to reduce claimant inflow and
backlogs. They form part of an emerging immigration policy
which will seek to admit migrants selectively, on the basis of
needed (higher level) job skills, and to reduce the inflow of spon-
sored kin and claimants, that is, migrants who are less likely to
meet economic criteria.
Glofulirrtion
All these factors must be set within the current global transfor-
mation of international trade, travel, communications, and
corrmerce which will itself probably have profound independent
effects on international population movements. The precise
nature of these impacts is justrbeginning to be discerned, and
only some :rre apparent in Canada. One trend is towards a rapid
expansion of work-related travel, short-term business visits (*o-
ally in the service or sales areas), and short-term work visas, both
in low shilled Fbs (agncultural workers from Mexico and the
Caribbean in British Columbia and southern Ontario) and in
skilled jobs (engineers, execrrtives, and technicians from Japan,
the United States, and Europe, working in Canadian subsidiaries
of international organizations).'r Another is an increase in the
number of undocrrmented migrants who do not plan to claim
asylum because their claims would probably fail. There is little
data on undocumented migrants in Canada, but preliminary
15 Margalet Michalorr*i, 'Vidton and vira workers: old winc in new bottlcs,' paper
prcrcoted at thc mfercnce, 'Mftprrion, Hunan Righs and Econonic Integra-
tim,'Yorl Univcrdty, Toronto, Novcmbcr rggr,
observation suggese that there are modest but incre"riog num-
ben in cities like Toronto, and that Latin Americans, particu-
larly Braziliaru and other nationalities who have little basis for
refugee claims, are well represented among them. Many arrived
on visitor's visas but have overstayed the authorized length of stay
and, by working, have broken a key provision of their visa. Oth-
ers have arrived clandestinely by land through the United States.
These various trends bearing on future migration from Latin
America to Canada suggest that the future will indeed be differ-
ent from the past, yet it will be influenced by the past. The
migration bridges established from Latin America to Canada in
the r97os and rgSos may not expand dramatically, but neither
are they lik ly to disappear.
